Who is Sandy Abrams, and why would his actions impact the firearms community? In order to partially answer this question, we present his profile below. In recent years he served on the NRA Board of Directors (and did so until stepping down last year.) There is no question that he has done much for the state firearm community. As the record shows, there is also no question that he has played a central role in some of our key losses.
Hard on the heels of the handgun ban in 1988, Abrams formed his company, Maryland Licensed Firearms Dealers Association (MLFDA), which sought to capitalize on the state's mandate that all handguns sold in the state be first evaluated and approved by the Handgun Roster Board. In return for fees from participating dealers, Abrams put new handgun products before the Board for consideration. He developed a close and accommodating relationship with the Maryland State Police licensing section; this is said to have given dealers ‘extra benefits' and hence an incentive to participate in MLFDA, rather than simply wait for another dealer to get a gun listed for sale. There is no doubt that many handguns now lawful for Maryland sale are listed because of Abrams' commercial service. There is also no doubt that some businessmen chafed at what they say are dirty tricks used to pressure them to support MLFDA.
It was in this time frame that the Maryland State Rifle & Pistol Association considered a proposal to aggressively distribute among its members information about how to apply for a Federal Firearms License (FFL) in the hope they would open small gun business around the state. The idea was to build a buffer around the large, stocking storefront dealers. Then, as now, state and federal authorities pressured gun businesses to give up trade in guns, so the laudable MSRPA goal was to deny officials an opportunity to concentrate pressure on large dealers, gunowners' main source of guns. Citing fear of competition, and leveraging his role in MSRPA leadership, Abrams was instrumental in killing the MSRPA plan. The irony of course is that today, lacking many remaining ‘kitchen table dealers' to hound, officials have indeed concentrated on the stocking storefront dealers – like Abrams' Valley Gun.
In the 1990 Democratic gubernatorial primary, Abrams ran as the Lt. Gov. candidate on Fred Griisser's ticket in opposition to William Schaefer. While nobody had realistic expectations that a Griisser/Abrams ticket would win, the ostensible goal was to ‘pay back' Schaefer for having signed the gun ban in 1988. The Griisser/Abrams effort diverted critical gunowner resources away from key General Assembly races (where some believed gun owners should defend champions who opposed the ban, and defeat foes who advocated the ban.) After Schaefer's victory (78 to 22 percent – about 2 points away from what pundits say a ham sandwich would have received against Schaefer) and hard legislative losses, gunowners were left with a General Assembly needlessly biased in favor of gun control, and an annoyed Governor who was needlessly inclined to sign gun control bills. Thus started a long string of legislative losses. Gun grabbers had been taught they could pass bills and keep their seats.
During the 1990's, Abrams' relationship with MSP led him to support some of their legislative agenda. At left he is shown in 1993 testifying on the police panel before the House Judiciary Committee in support of HB 366, which would have given MSP wide latitude in re-writing regulations affecting the purchase of handguns and so-called assault weapons in Maryland. ( From left: LT Czora Pinski, Superintendent Larry Tolliver, 1 st SGT Bernie Shaw and Sandy Abrams.) The MSRPA was able to kill that bill in the Senate during the last minutes of the legislative session. Abrams has reportedly stated his support of stronger MSP authority was in trade for a business-related bill.
With John Josselyn of the Associated Gun Clubs of Baltimore, Abrams served on the Glendening administration's Weapons Abuse Reduction panel, working side by side with gun grabbers like Vinnie DeMarco (then head of the state Brady operation), Stu Simms (Baltimore State's Attorney, mastermind behind the dirty tricks which disrupted the Citizens Against the Gun Ban referendum effort) and sundry ATF agents. Their involvement ensured that the gun control initiatives which soon emerged from the administration appeared validated by the firearm community and hence looked even-handed in the eyes of the public. ‘Everyone was at the table.'
When the administration needed exotic guns to use as props at anti-gun press conferences, there was no use going to MSP – usually police had never seen some of the models, much less confiscated them in crime. Where did they turn? Abrams' Valley Gun, which loaned them guns used in the police and governor photo ops.
Having run for state office as a Democrat, Abrams gained broader notoriety after he turned his attention to the GOP. In the 1994 gubernatorial election, he joined leaders of other firearm organizations in calling for all resources to be invested in another winner-take-all gamble, the Sauerbrey campaign, again diverting effort from winnable General Assembly races. Glendening's subsequent Gun Violence Act of 1996 – the first of his omnibus gun control packages – advanced through key General Assembly bottlenecks by margins under what the state association should have been able to win in the 1994 election. Again, neglect of attention to the People's House cost us dearly.
While Abrams had a lot of company in 1994, he played a unique role in the 1998 election. Ellen Sauerbrey again ran against Parris Glendening, though in her second bid adopted a much weaker pro-gun position. The now-classic Republican ‘whispering campaign' (“Shhhh. Ellen is with us, pass it on” – that is, having shills recruit issue groups without actually putting the candidate on record) was not succeeding as it had before. In August of that year, Abrams stepped in, ostensibly to recruit his MLFDA dealers to in turn recruit gun owners for Sauerbrey. He mailed dealers (and, as it turns out, the state police who worked for Glendening) a ‘private' letter over his signature that couldn't have been more effective for Glendening had Sarah Brady ghost-written it herself. He proclaimed just what the challenger didn't want, namely, pro-gun initiatives Sauerbrey would deliver if elected. Unfortunately, Sauerbrey had spent the election downplaying guns and pounding Glendening on taxes.
Glendening strategists saved the letter Abrams mailed them, and used it at the right moment. They spent heavily on ads pounding Sauerbrey for supposed ties with right wing extremists, citing Abrams' letter as example. They moved Sauerbrey's campaign ‘off issue': through mid-fall, her campaign spent more time on defense than attacking Glendening and in the end, lost huge. Pundits would later admire Abrams' letter as one of the tools used by the Glendening team, which received a national award for the most “brutally effective attack ads” of the campaign.
Depending on what happens with his present case, the man some call “Sellout Sandy” may play a central (and obviously unwanted) role in another gun community policy – and possibly legislative – setback.